The work of Sigmund Freud has always been supported by the oft repeated need to establish psychology as a science of nature.
The Freudian School of Psychoanalysis has tried to identify and explain (in clear and conscious contrast with post-Freudian developments) the naturalist and rationalist fundamentals that represent the fundamental assumptions behind the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.
This has essentially involved in two aspects:
• a methodological aspect, which highlighted the prescriptive elements inherent in the empirical character of psychoanalysis, namely the logical-experimental protocols that give analytic practice its rationality (judiciability and falsifiability);
• an epistemological aspect, regarding the establishment of objectivity inherent in psychoanalytic theory (metapsychology).
The aim is to re-establish (as opposed to the often teratological defects that haveinfluenced the development of psychoanalysis in the second half of twentiethcentury) a situation of necessary conformity (consistency) without which a science cannot be termed such. From our perspective (which, as already stated, is merely the same as Freud’s), psychoanalysis is neither a self-fulfilment technique nor conceptual poetics, but a science like any other, without the consequent abandoning of its own specificities.
An equally harmful approach is the attempt to apply a methodological model used in other contexts, not alien to the world of psychoanalysis, with the illusion, by doing so, of solving issues related to experimental control and respondingto criticisms concerningthe objectivity of theoretical propositions. However, similar to that which is happeningin the other fields, the path, if anything, is one of internal epistemology, able to explain the distinctive aspects of psychoanalysis.