The work of Sigmund Freud has always been supported by the oft repeated need to establish psychology as a science of nature.
The School of Freudian Psychoanalysis has tried to identify and explain (in clear and conscious contrast with post-Freudian developments) the naturalist and rationalist fundamentals that represent the fundamental assumptions behind the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.
This has essentially involved two aspects:
• a methodological aspect, which highlighted the prescriptive elements inherent in the empirical character of psychoanalysis, namely the logical-experimental protocols that give analytic practice its rationality (i.e. it can be tested and manipulated);
• an epistemological aspect, regarding the establishment of objectivity inherent in psychoanalytic theory (metapsychology).
The aim is to re-establish (in opposition to the teratology that has often influenced the development of psychoanalysis in the second half of the twentieth century) a situation of necessary conformity (consistency) without which a science cannot be termed such. From our perspective (which, as already stated, is merely the same as Freud’s), psychoanalysis is neither a self-fulfilment technique nor conceptual poetics, but a science like any other, without the consequent abandonment of its own specificities.
An equally harmful approach is the attempt to apply a methodological model used in other contexts, not alien to the world of psychoanalysis, with the illusion, by so doing, of solving issues related to experimental control and of responding to criticisms regarding the objectivity of theoretical propositions. However, similar to that which is occuring in the other fields, the path, if anything, is one of internal epistemology, capable to explaining the distinctive aspects of psychoanalysis.